I. Introduction
Compounding manufacturing is the mixing or altering of medications to produce a drug not readily available in the commercial market. 1 It is distinguished from large-scale drug manufacturing because, under certain circumstances, compounded drugs are not required to comply with the New Drug application process, and other labeling and advertising requirements through the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 2 Compound drug production is also separate from retail pharmacies because these drugs are generally produced before an individual prescription is given to a patient, and are produced in large quantities rather than one at a time.
3
The FDA regulates large-scale drug manufactures. 4 States regulate retail pharmacy production of drugs. 5 Compounding facilities fall in the middle ground, and require oversight by both the FDA and the State regulatory authorities. The Drug Quality and Security Act was passed on November 27, 2013 and attempts to clarify regulatory authority over drug compounding facilities, by allowing those that meet specific criteria to register with the FDA and avoid being required to comply with the New Drug application process. 6 Part II of this paper gives details on the horrific 2012 outbreak of fungal meningitis infections that spurred the enactment of new legislation relating to compounding manufacturers. Part III will discuss the compounding industry, its history as well as a brief comparison with large-scale pharmaceutical manufacturing. Part IV will explain the statutory and regulatory framework for this industry.
Part IV will then discuss the judicial interpretations relevant to federal authority, and the state role in pharmacy licensing. Part V will present the position that expanded federal authority is nedded to properly oversee this industry and prevent future public safety risks, and the current legislation, its strengths and weaknesses, and concerns that must be addressed to ensure it will have the desired effect.
II. Background on the 2012 NECC Outbreak
In late September 2012, reports spread across the United States about patients falling ill and dying from a terrible disease, which was later identified as fungal meningitis. 7 This avoidable tragedy was one of the worst public health crises this nation has ever experienced. 8 The disease was caused by microbial growth inside what was supposed to be a sterile syringe, the result of unsterile conditions at the production facility and contamination. 9 This particular drug was a steroid injection, preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate (MPA), which was administered to approximately 14,000 patients in 20 states to treat pain. 10 These shots were given to patients with joint and back pain, often associated with arthritis. plants. 12 This fungus rarely causes disease in humans, but a combination of factors made it deadly, including the fact that it was a preservative free vial, and in many of these deadly cases was injected directly into the spine, which has limited protection from the body's immune system . 13 After injection, the infection multiplied and spread through the epidural space, through the spinal fluid and eventually damage to the brain caused bleeding and stroke.
14 This compounding pharmacy that produced the drugs, the New England Compounding
Center (or NECC) located in Framingham, Massachusetts, made 17,000 potentially contaminated vials of the steroid injection. The 3,000 remaining unused lots were voluntarily recalled by NECC after the link was made to the outbreak. 15 To date, there are 751 reported cases, and 64
Americans have died.
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This was not the first time unsafe drugs from compounding pharmacies have injured people, though it was by far the worst and most widespread harm. 17 For certain drugs, for example the electrolytes used in IVs, manufacturers do not distribute them in one-dose units. 35 They are shipped in bulk concentrated form and need to be diluted and repackaged for use. 36 Historically, the doctor, nurse or pharmacist would make the compound sterile products (CSPs) on-site, even bedside, before administering the drug to the patient. 37 As hospitals and health systems have grown, the demand for compounded drugs grew; it became more efficient for the hospital or clinic to outsource the production of these drugs, rather than producing them on-site. 38 These compounding facilities located off-site, are also known as "outsource compounders", or "outsource facilities", and are also useful for hospitals when drugs are in short supply.
39
This should be contrasted against the large-scale drug manufacturing that big pharmaceutical companies perform. This type of manufacturing has been highly regulated because it presents more potential safety risks to patients. 40 Drugs that are mass-produced are not for a specific patient who already has a prescription; they are shipped all over the country, and often stored for 51 Id. ("It would be neither practical nor plausible for pharmacists to study individualized compounds in clinical trials or prepare NDAs for the near infinite variety of possible compounds that might be prescribed." Id.).
FDCA grants the FDA discretionary authority, not to prosecute for "minor violations" of the Act.
52
The FDA has defined "manufacturer" as; "a person who manufactures a drug…or who is licensed by such person to distribute or market the drug…" 53 , and as "the person who performs the…operations required to produce the product: (1) mixing, …(9) sterilizing, and (10) 69 The pharmacies argued that it was unconstitutional for the government to prevent these companies from advertising and promoting their products, because it restricted their right to commercial free speech. 70 The District Court and Federal Appeals Court held that the restriction was not permissible. 71 Since this regulation was only one of many in the FDAMA amendments pertaining to compounding pharmacies, the court also had to determine whether this provision was severable, or whether the whole Section 503A of the FDAMA had to be struck down. 72 The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that 
A. NECC violations through the regulatory lens
Now, that a tragedy has occurred and been widely publicized, the FDA and the state of Massachusetts have expressed deep regret for not acting sooner on the warning signs for NECC, and for a failure to provide regulatory clarity. 101 The problem is that even with solid and unambiguous rules, there may still be bad actors like NECC.
The NECC was allegedly using generated patient lists from clinics regardless if those patients had prescriptions, as their record of "individual patients" for whom their drugs were being produced. 102 The Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health noted that NECC had shipped out two of the later-recalled lots of contaminated MPA before the results of sterility testing had been received. 103 The FDA investigation inspection following the outbreak found there was mold growing on surfaces that were supposed to be sterile, and an air conditioning unit intended to stabilize air temperature and humidity was turned off at night, though it was supposed to run continuously. 104 The FDA form 483 issued following the facility inspection stated that vials of MPA from one of the suspect lots had "greenish black foreign matter" in the solution. 105 The In April 2013, the FDA issued a report that it had amplified its enforcement and regulation of sterile drug compounding pharmacies. 115 Though still asserting that it lacks sufficient authority, the FDA conducted 31 total inspections, three with additional administrative warrants because of refusal to cooperate by the compounding pharmacy. 116 The FDA identified these compounding pharmacies based on a risk assessment, considering the type of drugs being compounded, distribution, as well as previous reports from states on allegations of violations. 117 Almost all of these inspections were conducted in coordination with the respective SBOP regulators. 118 The resists and asserts that they are operating within their state license, the FDA can still apply for and obtain an administrative warrant to gain access.
131
The FDA and many Democrats disagreed. The FDA requested clarity and definition of authority, and the registration of certain compounding manufacturers. 132 The FDA Commissioner, Dr. Margaret Hamburg, repeatedly stated in the Congressional hearings, and in written testimony, that the FDA does not want unlimited authority over all compounders, and that it does not want to be in the business of regulating any pharmacy that is incidentally licensed to compound. 133 Dr. Hamburg asserted that authority should remain with the states. 134 The FDA Commissioner and Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA Center for Drug evaluation and research, also expressed that this current process is reactionary, that it responds to problems but does not prevent them. 135 Through the hours of questioning, the legislators specifically asked what authority the FDA thought it needed to properly prevent this type of health crisis from happening again. 136 The FDA requested clarity from Congress of the definition of non-traditional manufacturer or compounding manufacturer, emphasizing that this was the most central issue. 137 Ambiguity will only perpetuate the pushback from facilities for ability to inspect, and result in continued litigation challenging FDA actions. The FDA requested that the line between traditional compounding pharmacies, and manufacturers be articulated. Both the FDA, the industry and the legislators used many terms to describe these entities, calling them anything from compounding pharmacies, compounding manufacturers, and outsourcing facilities, which adds to the definitional confusion. 138 The FDCA and FDAMA draw the line that a compounding pharmacy will not be subject to New Drug Application requirements if they produce a limited amount of the compounded drug, but the FDA asked Congress to specify whether that means "10 units, 1,000 units or 10,000 units" etc. 139 This is vital because even if these companies are operating outside the scope of their state compounding license, the FDA authority over traditional manufacturers has different scope and applicability than what is needed for compounding manufacturers.
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Another concern repeatedly expressed by the FDA was that if a doctor, clinic or pharmacy discovers a problem in one state with a drug that came from out-of-state, the SBOP where the problem was found cannot go out and investigate and regulate the pharmacy in a foreign state. 141 They must contact the home SBOP and hope that they respond. 142 To remedy this potential area for problems, the FDA expressed a desire for a formal communication procedure both between states and between the states and the FDA. Another issue expressed by the FDA is that the agency has no metrics on how many of these compounding manufacturers exist across the United States, with estimates varying between 7,500 144 and 23,000. 145 The FDA asked for legislation to either require that pharmacies that 138 House May 2013 Hearing, supra note 120. 139 Id. for not registering would also provide an incentive for companies to comply. This knowledge of where these entities are operating, would be followed-up by FDA ability to inspect facilities, as well as documents and records (to be able to determine where they were shipping and when, which batches to inspect), the ability to take and test samples from the facilities, the ability to seize adulterated drugs, to issue penalties and even close down facilities found in violation of the FDCA.
V. Crafting New Legislation to Prevent Another Outbreak
After hours of hearings, pages of testimony, and requests for comments and input from both the government agencies and the compounding industry, Congress decided that legislation was necessary to prevent another outbreak. Though several bills were drafted in both the House and Senate, one bill emerged from Committee as the compromise between the House and the Senate.
This bill H.R.3204/S.8027, was recently signed into law, titled the "Drug Quality and Security The Drug Quality and Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), began as two bills with different agendas and so, has two parts. The first section, Title I, amends the FDAMA Section 503, and creates an exception to certain FDA regulations for those entities, which it labels "outsourcing facilities", that comply with eleven requirements and voluntarily register with the FDA. 157 Title II of the Act makes changes to drug distribution and supply chain tracing laws, and is not pertinent to the change in regulatory authority over outsourcing facilities, therefore, will not be discussed in this analysis.
158
This Act eliminates the controversial advertising provision in section 503A of the FDAMA, and amends the section intended to apply to traditional compounding or retail pharmacies. The bill re-names the current 503B, to be 503C, and inserts a new section 503B, intended to encompass compounding manufacturers or "outsource facilities". 159 The new 503B
acknowledges that outsourcing facilities are manufacturers, and will be regulated as such under the FDCA, but carves out an exemption for those facilities that operate in accordance with 503B. 160 The eleven requirements for exempt outsource facilities laid forth in 503B are:
1) Voluntary registration with FDA as an "outsourcing facility".
2) The drug compounded does not use "bulk drug substances", unless done in compliance with the USP monograph, or there is a shortage for the drug. 3) Any other ingredients, besides bulk substances, are compounded in compliance with the USP. 4) The outsource facility does not compound drugs or components withdrawn from the market because it is unsafe or not effective. 5) The outsource facility cannot compound what are "essentially copies" of an FDA approved drug. 6) If outsource facility compound drugs that are "demonstrably difficult" to produce, as identified by the FDA, they must follow additional safeguards during production. 7) If the drug has been compounded from a drug that is subject to a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (identified as more dangerous in some respect), then it must follow specific safety controls determined by the FDA. 8) The outsourcing facility is prohibited from wholesaling. 9) The outsourcing must pay fees to the FDA. 10) It must label the drug with contact information of the outsourcing facility, specific information about the batch and lot number of the drug, the drug name, and "this is a compounded drug", and "not for resale", among other things. 11) In addition to registering with the FDA, the outsourcing facility must make its facility and records "available" for regular risk-based inspections by the FDA, report all adverse events.
161
If the eleven requirements of 503B are met, outsourcing facilities are expressly exempted from the NDA application process, and certain labeling requirements.
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The Act requires outsourcing facilities to pay a $15,000 annual fee to register with the FDA, adjusted for inflation and for small businesses (to be defined by the FDA). 163 Outsourcing facilities would be subject to current good manufacturing practice requirements of the FDCA, and those registered facilities would not be required to be a licensed pharmacy within the state they operate. 164 There is careful attention to try to prevent the mistakes of the past; including adding a provision specifically stating that if any section of this law is found unconstitutional, it is severable and the rest will stand. 165 The FDA is required to establish a risk-based inspection system for outsourcing facilities, taking into account various factors including, the compliance history of the facility, any recalls linked to the facility, whether it has registered (implying that unregistered facilities are still subject to inspection authority). 166 In Section 105 of the Act, "Enhanced Communication", SBOPs are required to alert the FDA when they take action against compounding pharmacies operating outside of 503A, with warning letters, suspension of license, 161 Id. (1984) . If Congress has done so, its "unambiguously expressed intent" must be followed by the agency in its application. Id. at 842-43. If Congress has not done so, or remained silent on the question at issue, a reviewing court must respect the FDA's interpretation and issuance of regulations thereof so long as it passes the relatively low Act did not set forth how these requirements will be initiated or phased in, which means that it would take effect immediately upon its passage. This may have the effect of halting compound drug production at facilities that are attempting to get into compliance.
Commissioner Hamburg released a statement of mild disappointment after the Act became law. 176 The Commissioner acknowledged that she was "pleased" with its passage, and that it is a "good step" toward "stronger drug quality and safety laws", but that all of authority and clarity she asked for was not included. 177 Almost immediately after the Act was signed into law, the FDA issued two draft guidance documents on how the FDA interprets each section of the Act. 178 The FDA also issued three
Notice of Proposed Rules for the list of bulk substances to apply to each section, and requested nominations for additions to those lists. 179 The draft guidance for Sec. 503B gives outsource facilities instruction on how to register with the FDA if they meet the requirements, when they must register, what information is required and what fees will be assessed. 180 The draft guidance for pharmacy compounding under the new Sec. 503A restates the requirements for exemption from enhanced FDA reporting and advertising restrictions, and emphasizes that the FDA will exercise enforcement authority over those entities that operate outside that exemption. 181 The guidance states that the FDA will use a risk-based approach to discovering and investigating compounding pharmacies or outsource facilities to catch violations. 182 Under the new law, forces beyond government regulation could also drive patient safety.
With the new Act responsibility for ensuring safe drugs are administered to patients also falls to the clinics and hospitals that purchase these compound medications. If these vendors all decide to only purchase from outsource facilities that are registered with the FDA, then it may be seen as an indication of quality and become the industry standard.
The intended effect of the Act is to ensure more uniform nationwide compliance with safety procedures in outsourcing facilities, especially those that compound sterile preparations.
Consistent and rigorous compliance will lead to greater patient safety. The FDA should ensure that it uses these same incentives and penalties against outsource facilities, or compounding manufacturers who operate outside the law. This type of cash incentive should also be applied to whistleblowers that report compounding safety and quality violations, and hand out heavy monetary penalties to bad actors. The FDA should not hesitate to use individual exclusion from the Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement system, to prevent people like Barry Cadden, the CEO at NECC, or his partners, from reorganizing under a different company name after one has its license revoked for violations.
B. Conclusion
As this paper has presented, the former status quo ensuring the safety and quality of compounded drugs, especially sterile products, creates enforcement confusion and has resulted in 
